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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

22 October 1964

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 49-64: (Internal ONE Working Paper --
CIA Distribution Only)

SUBJECT: The Evolving "Solution" to the Cyprus Dispute

SUMMARY

President Makarios' power to influence the ultimate future of Cyprus has increased considerably in recent months, and we do not foresee any reversal of this trend in the near future. Makarios probably will continue to be successful in resisting efforts by the Greek government to undermine him. His month-old peace offensive, which has eased the pressures on the Turkish Cypriots, probably has increased international support for the Greek Cypriots, and has made it more difficult than ever for Turkey to use the threat of military intervention to influence events on the island. A continuation of this new policy may lead a fair number of Turkish Cypriots to give up the struggle even though control of the government remains in Greek Cypriot hands. Thus while no agreed settlement of the conflict is in sight and the dispute will drag on diplomatically, a de facto victory for the Greek Cypriots appears likely. It remains unclear whether Makarios will use this influence to remain head of a small island -- relying to a considerable extent on support from the USSR and the nonaligned world internationally and on the Communist Party locally, or whether he will attempt to bring about enosis under such favorable conditions as to make it possible for him to play an important role in Greek politics.

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1. President Makarios' September decision to relax the pressure on the Turkish Cypriots marks a major turning point in the Cyprus conflict. Previously Makarios had followed a policy of using as much pressure against the Turkish Cypriots as he could without sparking Turkish intervention. Taking advantage of US opposition to Turkish intervention -- and Ankara's reluctance to take action which might have lead to a Greek-Turkish war -- Makarios had demonstrated considerable skill in the art of brinkmanship. The Turkish air strikes in early August, however, demonstrated that he had about reached the limit of a policy of military pressure, and his intensification of economic pressures only led to increased Turkish Cypriot determination to resist the growing dangers of Turkish military moves to break the economic blockade.

2. Moreover, if the Greek Cypriots were to gain the support they obviously hoped for from the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly session, Makarios probably felt certain ostensibly humanitarian steps were desirable if not essential. Thus he offered to lift the economic blockade of Turkish Cypriot areas, to grant a general amnesty, to resettle Turkish refugees, to remove all armed

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posts if the Turks would do the same, and to accept UN suggestions for general pacification. Makarios probably believes that his new approach will also cause some of the long-suffering Turkish Cypriots to give up their struggle. In any case, such an attempt costs Makarios little, since none of the offers he has made would alter the fact that control of the government of Cyprus would remain in Greek Cypriot hands -- the basic aim of the Greek Cypriots when they launched the present struggle in December 1963.

Changing Conditions on Cyprus

3. Despite the bitterness and hatred engendered by the violence of the past ten months, there is some chance that his new policy, if pursued with a moderate amount of imagination and consistency, will cause many Turkish Cypriots to give up the struggle. How many would be willing ^{to} live in perpetuity under Greek Cypriot rule and how many would emigrate to Turkey would depend on a great variety of factors, of course, but at least many of the peasants probably would stay if they felt secure in their persons. Turkish Cypriots in Limosol and Ktima as well as in several villages have already accepted cease-fire terms amounting to surrender and are living under Greek Cypriot rule. Despite the claims of Turkish Cypriots that they would die rather than

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surrender, in none of these actions have more than 10-20 Turks died before their forces surrendered. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots in the other isolated areas are clearly dispirited and becoming increasingly dependent, and many of them will be strongly tempted to try to return to a more normal existence if Makarios gives them any choice other than dogged resistance or surrender.

4. The major exception to this changing Turkish Cypriot attitude is that of the Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia and along the Nicosia-Kyrenia road. However, even they are weary of the struggle and are probably more susceptible to Makarios' peace offensive than they would have been a few months ago. Yet ^{their} position is much stronger than that of the other Turkish Cypriots. There are enough of them in this area (some 35,000) and enough of the community's leaders to enable them to maintain their morale to some extent. Moreover, they hold -- in connection with the 650-man Turkish army contingent -- a strategically important enough area so that they are still far from ready to call off their resistance. This has been clearly demonstrated during recent weeks by their unwillingness to follow Ankara's lead in accepting the terms worked out by the Greek Cypriots,

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the UN, and Ankara for opening the Nicosia-Lyrenia road for fear that their strategic position^{would}/be eroded. Nevertheless, they, too, are becoming increasingly convinced that their hope for achieving either federation or partition is slight because of Turkey's unwillingness to use military force against Makarios.

5. There are also a number of indications that Greek Cypriot attitudes toward the way to deal with the Turkish Cypriots have improved. Greek Cypriots today do not appear to be in the same frustrated, destructive frame of mind they were in when the struggle began. In part this is probably because control of the government is now in Greek Cypriot hands, thereby increasing their assurance and self-confidence regarding the future. At least some of the Greek Cypriots are probably also growing tired of the struggle, though this is much less apparent than is Turkish Cypriot war weariness. Finally, the Greek Cypriot forces, which began as virtually autonomous bands subject to little governmental authority, have gradually been brought under the authority of the government and of the Greek officers and units sent from mainland Greece. Makarios could, of course, revert to a policy of force, though this seems unlikely for at least the next few months. New incidents could also lead to new rounds of bloodshed, but the

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chances of such incidents seem less than a few months or even a few weeks ago.

International Developments

6. Makarios has also been active in seeking increased international support for his position. He has for some time attempted to gain increased Soviet support, both in terms of arms supplies and Soviet agreement to oppose any Turkish military move against the island. The recent Cypriot delegation to Moscow, while not as successful as Makarios would like the West to believe, apparently did secure a Soviet agreement to supply arms and a vague Soviet promise to oppose -- in an undefined manner -- any Turkish military moves. While Moscow has not rushed to commit its prestige to the support of the Greek Cypriots, it appears to have become increasingly convinced that Makarios has considerable staying power and is worth supporting. However, Moscow has taken some steps to lead Turkey to hope for a change in Soviet policy, which might occur if the USSR became convinced that Makarios was actively seeking enosis on terms that would bring Cyprus within the NATO context.

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7. Makarios has already secured a resolution from the non-aligned conference recently held in Cairo supporting Cyprus' right to self-determination and condemning outside interference in the affairs of the island -- at least an implied condemnation of Turkey. If Makarios continues his present policies on the island, he would have a good chance of securing a majority in the UN General Assembly for a resolution along the same general lines. However, it seems doubtful that he would be able to secure a majority vote declaring the London-Zurich accords null and void -- a vote which, while it would have no standing in international law, would greatly improve Makarios' position. Even without the latter type of resolution, however, a General Assembly resolution favoring full self determination and opposing outside interference would place further inhibitions on any Turkish intervention. Combined with more humane treatment of the Turkish Cypriots, such a resolution probably will make it increasingly difficult for the Turks to prevent further erosion of their position and ^{of} the position of their community on Cyprus.

8. Thus Makarios' peace offensive presents major difficulties for Turkey, though of a different nature than Turkey's earlier problems. Having apparently decided at the end of the summer

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that it would henceforth have to take a stronger line with Makarios and pay less attention to US urgings of caution, Ankara committed itself to using force if necessary to rotate its military contingent on the island and to send food and other supplies to beleaguered Turkish Cypriots. Once Makarios offered to ease the economic blockade, however, Ankara had little choice but to test his sincerity. While the economic blockade is still in at least partial effect in some parts of the island, it has been modified enough so that Turkey feels it unnecessary if not impossible to rely on force to break it. Similarly, Makarios met the Turks part way in devising a formula for reopening of the Nicosia-Kyrenia road, which probably will be followed by a settlement of the Turkish troop rotation issue.

9. The leaders of the Greek government, while relieved that the easing of tensions reduces the chances of a Turkish intervention, are growing increasingly concerned with Makarios' dealings with the UAR and the USSR. In addition, they are smarting from the numerous defeats they have suffered at the hands of Makarios in their attempts to undermine his position on the island so as to make it possible to offer Turkey a few concessions leading,

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to
hopefully, a settlement of the dispute. General Grivas appears to be steadily losing ground while Makarios' political position on the island has improved considerably during recent months. The conflict between Makarios and Grivas has begun to come out in the open, but it seems likely that in any contest with Grivas -- or even Athens -- Makarios will be successful in retaining his hold on the Greek Cypriots.

10. Some of the Greek leaders now feel that their only chance to bring about an "acceptable" Cyprus solution is to have the 10,000 man Greek military force on the island -- working with whatever Greek Cypriot support it can obtain -- stage a coup to oust Makarios and proclaim "instant enosis" with Greece. Greek leaders have promised that once they have full control of Cyprus they will agree to a NATO base on the island, but that the US must guarantee to prevent Turkish intervention when enosis is effected. Given Prime Minister Papandreu's record of irresolution and indecisiveness, we doubt that he would be willing to carry out such a coup. Unless it were well-planned and quickly executed, it could lead to open fighting between Greek and Greek Cypriot forces with disastrous political consequences for Papandreu. Moreover, while Papandreu has often called for enosis, the

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achievement of full independence by the Greek Cypriots would be enough of a Greek victory to prevent Athens from being humiliated.

11. Thus Makarios continues to increase his power to decide the ultimate status of Cyprus. There are good grounds for believing that he would prefer to remain president of Cyprus rather than see Cyprus become a part of Greece and return to his religious role. He has even said that the UK sovereign bases would have to be removed before enosis could be carried out. With the growth of anti-Western and pro-Soviet attitudes on Cyprus -- and the feeling of many Greek Cypriots that Greece has not given them its full support -- Makarios today probably has greater freedom to attach conditions to enosis than he had a few months ago. Thus Makarios may see himself leading a small but not unimportant nonaligned nation, relying for support on the UAR and the USSR as well as Greece. Under these circumstances he would continue to rely heavily on the powerful Communist Party of Cyprus (AKEL), which he has always regarded as a group he could use for his own ends. Despite his popularity and skill at political maneuvering this would be a dangerous game, for AKEL is well-organized and led, and the non-Communist political forces are weak and disorganized. Under such conditions, Cyprus probably could move considerably closer to the

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USSR than it is at present, though it seems unlikely that Makarios would willingly become completely dependent on Moscow.

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12. Makarios' ambitions may, however, be of such dimensions that he will not be satisfied to remain president of a small island republic. He may believe that if he is able to bring about enosis on his terms that he will be such a hero to the Greek populace as to enable him to play a leading role in Greek political life. Thus he has firmly resisted granting any concessions to the Turks -- such as agreeing to a Turkish base -- in return for Turkish agreement to enosis. Moreover, he apparently has begun to seek to recruit political supporters in Greece. This move may be only a precaution in case Greek Prime Minister Papandreu attempts to move against him, but it could also be a first step to build a political organization in Greece.

13. Whether Cyprus becomes a unitary Greek Cypriot state or is united with Greece thus is likely to be determined largely by President Makarios and what he sees as the best method of satisfying his ambitions for political leadership. Either development will be extremely repugnant to Turkey, though Turkish leaders seem to

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prefer an independent Cyprus, even if it is friendly to the USSR, to a Cyprus joined to Greece. While independence has appeared to many as contrary to Turkey's national interest, it may be due to factors other than frustration and bitterness. Once enosis occurs, Turkey's chance of gaining a position of any real influence on the island will have disappeared. The Turks may calculate that an independent Cyprus -- drifting closer to Moscow -- could gradually become of greater concern to all of NATO and that opposition to Turkish military action might then decline. In any case, Inonu's minority government, which is due to face national elections by ^{October} / 1965, is too weak to agree to any of the solutions proposed for Cyprus, though it may be strong enough to resist pressures for military intervention, particularly if Makarios continues his peace offensive.

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